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Abstract
If fiscal policy exerts pressure on public services, then attention often falls
on the public-private sector wage differential. Estimated with longitudinal
employer-employee data for the years 2002-16 in the United Kingdom, among men
there was no significant public sector wage premium. However, women received
an average 4% premium compared with working in private sector firms.
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1 Introduction
In 2010 the UK government imposed caps on nominal wage increases throughout the
public sector. This policy was relaxed in 2017 as real wage growth in the private
sector recovered (see Cribb (2017) for a summary). The UK is not the only country
to restrain public sector pay while attempting fiscal consolidation. Such policies are
commonly justified by the supposed existence of large public sector wage premiums
which are not allocative, due to the bargaining power of trade unions (e.g. France in
2017 and the United States in 2019). However, pay-setting restraint could affect the
ability of organisations to hire and retain employees, having implications for services
provision. Wage policies in the public sector can also affect the level and volatility of
unemployment in the wider economy (e.g. Gomes, 2015). Therefore, it is important
that public sector wage premiums are measured robustly.
The unobserved quality of workers across sectors is likely endogenous to any
wage differential (Nickell and Quintini, 2002), biasing ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates from cross-sectional data of the public sector premium. Privatisation has
been used as a ‘natural experiment’ to circumvent this (e.g. Haskel and Szymanski,
1993). Estimates were later improved using longitudinal household survey data, which
could address selection on worker unobservables, typically finding larger public sector
premiums (e.g. Disney and Gosling, 1998). However, estimates from these data will
also be confounded if worker mobility between sectors is related to differences in
other wage-relevant employer fixed characteristics. For example, Chatterji et al. (2011)
used UK cross-sectional employer-employee data to suggest that gender and sectoral
wage differences are related to certain workplace characteristics. These included
performance-related pay and family-friendly working, which were more common in
the private and public sectors, respectively.
Using longitudinal employer-employee panel data and estimating gender-specific
Abowd et al. (1999) (henceforth AKM) wage equations, this article revisits the UK
public sector premium.
2 Method
Let there be i = 1, . . . ,N workers, j = 1, . . . , J firms, t = 1, . . . ,T years, Ti years per worker
and N ∗ =
∑
i Ti total observations. The AKM-type wage equations are given by:
wit = αi +φ
G(i)
J(it) + x
′
itβ
G(i) + εit , (1)
where wit is the log real hourly wage. xit is a vector of time-varying observable worker,
job or firm characteristics. Firm fixed effects are given byφG(i)J(it), where J(it) = j indicates
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the firm employing worker i in year t. Similarly, G(i) = g ∈ {Male,Female} indicates
gender. The remaining heterogeneity is in the residual, εit.
Equation (1) can be estimated using least squares with a strict exogeneity
assumption:
Eit
[
εit | xit,αi ,φG(i)J(it),G(i)
]
= 0 .
Estimates of the firm fixed effects will be biased if employees switch firms according
to some component of εit, such as transitory shocks to firm-wide or worker-firm
match-specific effects. However, Jewell et al. (2018) find this exogenous mobility
assumption is not obviously rejected in these UK data.1
The worker fixed effects are transferable, affecting wages wherever and whenever
an employee works, and in whatever job. The firm fixed effects measure relative wage
premiums, which employees receive upon moving between firms. Estimates of these
effects are only comparable within mobility groups, i.e. connected sets of workers and
firms (Abowd et al., 2002). Therefore, the analysis focuses on the largest identified
mobility groups of men or women in the panel dataset.
Using estimates of Equation (1), the male or female public sector premium is
defined as:
δ̂
g
AKM = Eit
[
φ̂
G(i)
J(it) | G(i), J(it) ∈ P ublic
]
−Eit
[
φ̂
G(i)
J(it) | G(i), J(it) < P ublic
]
,
where P ublic is the set of employers not in the private sector. This measures the
expected log hourly wage gain for an employee who switches from the private to the
public sector, keeping the characteristics in xit unchanged.
Compare Equation (1) with the reduced form version:
wit = αi + P ublicitδ
G(i)
WFE + x
′
itβ
G(i) + rit , (2)
where P ublicit = 1J(it)∈P ublic and rit is the composite error term. Least squares estimates
of the public sector premium from Equation (2), δ̂ gWFE , will be unbiased compared with
δ̂
g
AKM only if the following orthogonality condition holds:
Eit
[
(rit − r i)(P ubit − P ubi) | G(i)
]
= 0 , (3)
where bars over variables represent time averages. This will not hold when individuals
move between sectors systematically from high to low wage employers, or vice versa.
1See Card et al. (2013) and Card et al. (2018) for evidence in favour of this assumption for Germany
and Portugal, respectively.
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3 Data
The data are from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), 2002-16.
This is drawn from administrative records each April by the Office for National
Statistics (ONS). It is a panel of employees without attrition, where each year gives
an approximate 1% random and representative sample of UK employees. The linked
employers in these data are enterprises.2
The analysis looks at the hourly wage rate according to employer payrolls,
excluding overtime. Wages are deflated to 2002 prices using April values of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).3 Only prime-working-age employees, aged 25-64, who
have non-missing records of earnings and hours are considered. Observations with
1-100 basic paid weekly hours are dropped, as are non-main jobs, those at a trainee
or an apprentice level, and any jobs incurring a loss of pay in the reference period for
whatever reason. Unless stated otherwise, xit contains the following job characteristics:
squared and cubed employee age, cubic polynomials for tenure and employer size
(number of employees), whether a job is part-time (thirty hours or less), and 3-digit (92
categories) occupations. xit also includes year fixed effects. The private or public status
of an employer is from administrative records.4 See Jewell et al. (2018) for further
details on how this dataset can be constructed from ASHE cross-sections.
The estimation sample contains only person-year observations which are in the
largest male or female mobility groups. This has around 80-90% of ASHE observations
each year, and is generally UK representative, though firm size is marginally higher
than in the population. Table 1 gives brief sample descriptive statistics.
4 Results
Estimating Equation (1) in the years 2002-16, the public sector premiums are 0.0
and 3.8 log points for male and female hourly wages, respectively (Table 1, row
3). Estimates accounting for only worker fixed effects are larger, being 2.9 and 4.5
log points (row 2). This suggests that, when workers move from the private to the
public sector, they tend to do so from relatively low wage employers within the
former to relatively high wage employers within the latter. Pooled OLS estimates
(row 1) are consistent with previous results from the UK, that individuals with a low
2“An Enterprise can be defined as ... an organisational unit producing goods or services, which
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making ... An enterprise carries out one or
more activities at one or more locations.” ONS. In the public sector, schools, hospitals, government
departments, the British Broadcasting Corporation etc. are enterprises.
3Accessed from UK National Statistics, 24/4/2017.
4ASHE contains the tax authority classification: private companies, sole proprietors and partnerships
are classified as private sector. Public corporations & nationalised industries, central government, local
authorities, non-profit bodies or mutual associations are classified as public sector.
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permanent wage component disproportionately work in the public sector, especially
among men. Rows 4-6 of Table 1 present estimates without occupation controls in the
wage equations. Comparing the pooled OLS estimates (rows 1 & 4), the differences
in employee occupations between the public and private sectors account for a large
part of the average wage differences between the sectors. The estimated public sector
premiums from the wage models with worker and firm fixed effects are greater when
occupation controls are left out (rows 5-6). This suggests that part of the average wage
gain experienced by workers who switch from the private to the public sector is due to
related wage gains from them also changing occupations at the same time.
Figure 1 shows kernel density estimates over employee-year observations of the
estimated firm fixed wage effects, by gender, and comparing sectors. These effects
have tighter variance in the public sector. If working in the private sector, then men
and women had similar tendencies to work in very high wage firms (> 15 log points).
However, there is a stark gender difference in so far as women were more likely to work
in very low wage firms in the private sector (< −15 log points).
Public sector employers range from schools to financial services regulators. Table 2
presents estimates comparable to Table 1, row 3 for subgroups of public sector
enterprises. In local authorities, the wage premium compared with the private sector
was around 2% for both men and women. In central government, men received a 3%
wage penalty, whereas women received a 5% premium. The largest premiums were for
employees in public corporations and nationalised industries (e.g. National Rail and
the BBC).
Figure 2 shows estimates of δgWFE and δ
g
AKM from the largest mobility groups of
men and women in rolling 7-year windows, along with shares of employment in the
public sector. The wage premium for women was stable over 2002-16. For men the
premium increased by over 6 log points in this period. This was despite the public
sector wage moderation policies of government since 2010.
5 Conclusion
Previous estimates of the UK public-private sector wage differential have not
addressed unobserved worker and unobserved firm heterogeneity. After doing so, the
estimated average public sector premium received by men between 2002 and 2016
men was zero. The value among women was 4%.
The importance of firms in frictional wage dispersion has been increasingly studied
in recent years (e.g. Card et al., 2018). This article showcases a valuable source of
linked employer-employee panel data from the UK, which adds to sources from other
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countries already extensively studied. Future research should use this to revisit what
the determinants of other UK wage differentials are.
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TABLE 1: Estimates of the UK public sector log wage premium and sample
descriptives, 2002-16
Male Female
With 3-digit occ. controls (preferred):
1. Pooled OLS - δ̂OLS -0.020*** 0.040***
(0.003) (0.002)
2. Worker fixed effects - δ̂WFE 0.029*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.002)
3. Worker & firm fixed effects - δ̂AKM 0.000 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001)
Without occ. controls:
4. Pooled OLS - δ̂OLS 0.103*** 0.181***
(0.003) (0.003)
5. Worker fixed effects - δ̂WFE 0.044*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.003)
6. Worker & firm fixed effects - δ̂AKM 0.013*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mean (st. dev.) log hourly wage:
Public 2.52 2.31
(0.48) (0.46)
Private 2.40 2.10
(0.57) (0.49)
Share in public sector 0.30 0.53
Share full-time (>30 hours):
Public 0.88 0.57
Private 0.93 0.61
Mean firm size (000s of employees):
Public 28.9 16.4
Private 14.7 25.8
N ∗: person-year obs. 797,835 858,136
N : Persons 119,424 126,980
Public sector firms 5,607 9,690
Private sector firms 43,137 38,517
£2002. Standard errors (in parentheses) estimated robustly using person clusters. Alternative standard
errors estimated using firm-year clusters were of similar magnitude and did not affect inference;
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, two-sided tests.
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TABLE 2: Estimates of the log wage premium relative to private sector for types of
public enterprise, 2002-16
Male Female
Central government:
Share of all UK employees 0.09 0.19
Mean log hourly wage diff. 0.155 0.262
Wage Premium - δ̂AKM -0.027*** 0.055***
(0.001) (0.001)
Local authority:
Share of all UK employees 0.11 0.23
Mean log hourly wage diff 0.127 0.174
Wage Premium - δ̂AKM 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.001)
Public corp. & nationalised:
Share of all UK employees 0.04 0.02
Mean log hourly wage diff 0.009 0.262
Wage Premium - δ̂AKM 0.047*** 0.167***
(0.002) (0.002)
Non-profit serving hholds:
Share of all UK employees 0.06 0.10
Mean log hourly wage diff. 0.119 0.179
Wage Premium - δ̂AKM -0.037*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.002)
£2002. Standard errors (in parentheses) estimated robustly using person clusters;
*** statistically significant at the 1% level, two-sided tests.
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of estimated firm fixed wage effects, φ̂j , by gender: employees
in private or public sector jobs
(a) Male
(b) Female
Notes.- kernel densities estimated with a bandwidth of one log point. Top and bottom 1% of firm effects
by gender and sector not displayed. For each gender, the effects over public and private sector firms
together have mean zero.
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FIGURE 2: Estimates of the UK public sector wage premium, 7-year rolling
sub-periods
(a) Male
(b) Female
Notes.- ‘Year’ gives the mid-point of each estimation window. ‘Raw’ gives the sample mean wage
premium. ‘WFE’ gives estimates from wage models with with worker fixed effects. ‘AKM’ refers to
estimates from wage models with worker and firm fixed effects. ‘Share Pub.’ gives the share of sample
employees in the public sector (right axis).
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